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CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES IN SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 
Benjamin L. Berger 
Osgoode Hall Law School* 
Viewed in the longue durée, criminal law has undergone a 
contemporary revolution in constitutional significance.  Consider Milsom’s 
inimitable assessment of the historical place of criminal law in the 
development of the common law legal system:  
The miserable history of crime in England can be shortly told. 
Nothing worth-while was created.  There are only 
administrative achievements to trace.  So far as justice was 
done throughout the centuries, it was done by jurors and in 
spite of savage laws.1  
For Milsom, criminal law was an exception to the development of the 
common law, at best an embarrassing outlier in the development of the 
common law, and at worst a field of savagery and misery.  To be sure, it 
was a field from which little could be learned about the evolution of the 
common law conceptions of just legal rule. 
However true this assessment may have been, that it could be 
plausibly advanced is a sufficient to mark the tremendous shift that has 
occurred in the imagined location of criminal law within the landscape of 
the key elements of legal rule, or what we might call criminal law’s place 
within the framework of modern constitutional essentials.  The history of 
criminal law reform is of course deep, with great periods of creative 
legislative innovation and political activity in ideas of criminal justice.  Yet 
with the rise of rights constitutionalism as the heart of the modern liberal 
rule of law, criminal law has begun a new life in which it is subject to 
substantial justice-based innovation through appeal to the internal and 
basic norms of the legal system itself.  It has transformed from a marginal 
arena of law, as Milsom described it, to the quintessential site for the 
working out of central constitutional themes.  With the ascendance of 
rights protecting constitutions, the criminal law – with its liberally 
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transfixing confrontation between state and citizen – has offered itself as 
the paradigmatic place for working out liberal conceptions of justice.  And 
so criminal law has been fused to constitutional law, with key 
constitutional themes expressing themselves through debates about 
criminal law, and traditional criminal law issues and debates entering a 
constitutional idiom.  Far from the picture painted by Milsom, criminal 
law is now best understood and approached as a species of the 
constitutional, or so this chapter will argue.  
The tethering of criminal law and constitutional law has two aspects. 
The first section of this chapter will explore the ways in which substantive 
criminal law – the principles of criminal liability – has become a 
laboratory for the constitutional, focussing and advancing classic 
questions of constitutional concern.  The nature of sovereignty and the 
role of state violence, basic understandings of the nature of the legal 
subject, the guiding logics of constitutional judgment, and the role of 
discretion and mercy in legal rule – all preserves of constitutional thought 
– are issues that have been exercised and explored most dramatically
through debates around criminal responsibility. 
The second part of this chapter will explore an equally notable trend, 
which is the translation of classic criminal law debates into constitutional 
questions, the movement of traditional concerns of substantive criminal 
law into a constitutional register.  From the limits of the criminal law and 
the basic requirements of fault to the role of criminal defences and the 
nature of just punishment, core questions of criminal law theory have 
become irreducibly constitutional, guided by claims of rights and the basic 
norms of the legal order.   
The extent to which courts have explored the constitution 
foundations of criminal law has been extremely uneven across national 
traditions.  Certain broad and essentially formal principles can be found 
across a number of countries, such as the principle of legality found in the 
constitutional law of Germany, France, Japan, South Africa, and indeed 
most constitutional orders.2  Yet when it comes to the application of 
constitutional principles to the general part of the criminal law, 
exploration has often been rather modest.  The United States Supreme 
Court, for example, has engaged in extensive constitutional reflection on 
criminal procedure, but “has ventured forth with great trepidation”3 when 
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it comes to substantive law.  By contrast, Canada has been at the vanguard 
of constitutional criminal law.  The combination of its young bill of rights 
(the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982), its unitary criminal law, and 
its involved Supreme Court has generated intriguing case examples and a 
dynamic contemporary jurisprudence on the topic.  George Fletcher has 
observed that these factors have combined to make the Canadian Supreme 
Court “one of the leading jurisdictions in the world in applying 
constitutional provisions to the general part of criminal law.” 4   The 
Canadian jurisprudence is thus a particularly fruitful point of illustration 
and will therefore serve as a kind of case study in this chapter exploring 
the mutual imbrication of criminal law and modern rights 
constitutionalism.   
The Canadian case is also valuable, however, because it sounds a 
cautionary note to those who might imagine that the constitutionalization 
of criminal law would lead inexorably to its progressive development.  
Much of value has been generated through the fecund interaction of 
substantive criminal justice and constitutional principles.  Yet this 
interaction has proved as likely to limit change and entrench the old as to 
offer a lever for enlightened reform.  In all of this, the Canadian cases are 
offered as instructive, not as exemplary.   
And it is here that one arrives at a challenging irony.  Despite the 
profound change in the imaginative relationship between criminal law and 
the larger legal structure – with the migration of criminal law from the 
margins of legal history to the centre of our constitutional imagination – 
more of Milsom’s assessment remains apposite than we might have hoped, 
with the contemporary history of criminal law still invested with its share 
of misery and much criminal justice still left to be done in spite of the law.  
Ultimately, the intimate relationship between these two legal fields has 
drawn into sharper relief the ineluctably political nature and social 
functions of the criminal law.   
 
I. Critical Constitutional Themes in Criminal Law 
 
 To claim that contemporary substantive criminal law must be 
understood as a species of constitutional reflection is to assert a certain 
coincidence in the thematic preoccupations that organize thought and 
debate in both fields.  This section identifies four central concerns of 
modern constitutional theory that have found forceful and focussed 
expression in the central problematics of contemporary criminal law.  
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Examination of these “constitutional dimensions” of criminal law reveals 
not only the way in which criminal law has become a laboratory for the 
constitutional, but also the deeper constitutional register in which the 
more specific criminal law issues addressed later in this chapter work 
themselves out.   
 
1. Sovereignty and state violence 
 
Legal theory has seen a renaissance of interest in the nature and 
relevance of the concept of sovereignty in modern constitutional orders.  
Some of this scholarly attention has been generated by contemporary 
challenges to the nation state form, challenges posed by a variety of 
phenomena, including new patterns of global migration and the 
emergence (or recognition) of transnational legal orders.  Others have 
returned to the question of sovereignty in view of particular exercises of 
exceptional executive action taken in reaction to perceived existential 
threats to society.  This return to the concept of sovereignty has brought 
renewed engagement with the work of Carl Schmitt, who put sovereignty 
at the heart of his constitutional theory, and that of his contemporary re-
interpreters, most notably Giorgio Agamben. 5   Such scholarship has 
turned attention to the somewhat mysterious manner in which the 
apparently antiquated concept of sovereignty has nevertheless continued 
to express itself in modern liberal constitutionalism.  Paul Kahn has 
offered among the most serious and searching engagements with these 
themes, exposing the anxieties and paradoxes that afflict the attempt to 
square the liberal culture of law’s rule with the on-going political salience 
of ideas of sovereignty.6 
 The criminal accused is a palimpsest for state sovereignty, a layered 
expression of the variety of ways in which contests over and assertions of 
sovereignty are an abiding feature of our constitutional lives.  At one very 
concrete level the criminal accused continues to show what Foucault 
claimed so powerfully, that the work of sovereign power is marked on the 
body.7  Sovereignty is asserted and exercised through the very physical 
business of criminal punishment.  The monopoly on the legitimate use of 
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6 Paul W. Kahn, Putting Liberalism in its Place (2005); Paul W. Kahn, Political 
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violence that Weber identified as the calling card of state sovereignty is 
most habitually and routinely asserted in the modern state through the 
ascription of criminal responsibility and the punishment that follows.8  
For constitutional theory that insists on the violence at the foundation of 
legal authority, the figure of the criminal accused becomes central, as it 
was for Robert Cover.9  Talk about the violence of sovereign authority 
sheds any comfortingly metaphorical character when attention is turned to 
the work of the criminal law.   
 But at another layer, the criminal accused also stands as a challenge 
about the source of that sovereign authority: on whose behalf is one called 
to account by the criminal law?  Where does one find the sovereign will 
that must, in constitutional theory, underwrite this coercive exercise of 
authority?  The criminal law persistently raises this issue of who the 
constitutional “we” is, who the criminal law reflects and on whose behalf it 
speaks.  Debates about the nature of the reasonable person – so central to 
substantive criminal law – are one expression of this issue, as is the classic 
theoretical concern over morals legislation and the limits of criminal law.  
Yet the use of criminal law as an assertion of the political sovereignty of a 
certain community takes on far more concrete and literal forms as well.  In 
Canada, the extension of Crown sovereignty over a vast territory already 
inhabited by Indigenous societies was carried out in substantial measure 
through the expanded reach of the criminal law and the performance of 
sovereignty through criminal trials.10  Today, Indigenous rights and title 
remain the fundamental challenges to state sovereignty in Canada; and 
today, we still see criminal law playing a significant role in the political 
domination of Indigenous peoples, with soaring rates of Aboriginal 
incarceration, a crisis to which the Supreme Court of Canada has itself 
called attention.11 
 Finally, the boundaries of ordinary criminal law have been the chief 
site for the contemporary reappearance of certain forms of executive 
action that trouble prevailing orthodoxies about the nature of sovereign 
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From Max Weber, Essays in Sociology (2009), 77 ff.  
9 Robert M. Cover, ‘Violence and the Word’, (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 ff. 
10 See, e.g., Hamar Foster, ‘The Queen’s Law is Better Than Yours: International 
Homicide in Early British Columbia’, in Jim Phillips, Tina Loo, and Susan Lewthwaite 
(eds.), Essays in the History of Canadian Criminal Law, Vol 5: Crime and Criminal 
Justice (1994), 41 ff. 




authority in a constitutional democracy.  One sees this in the array of 
executive-empowering responses to terrorism and security concerns 
around the world, for which Guantanamo Bay stands as a kind of apogee.12 
Again, the criminal accused takes centre stage.  As the wrongdoer has 
floated between ordinary criminal law norms and the exceptional spaces 
and rules created in response to extraordinary threats – as crime becomes 
terror and the criminal becomes the enemy combatant – he has marked 
the complexity and arguable instability of sovereign authority in modern 
constitutional life.   
 
2. Anthropology of the Legal Subject 
 
The extension of a package of constitutional rights and freedoms 
depends on a tacit anthropology.  Constitutional rights are animated by a 
more or less explicit set of assumptions about what is of irreducible value 
in the human subject, such that it calls for legal regard and protection.  So, 
at one level, one can cull a peculiar picture of a flourishing human life from 
the fundamental freedoms, claims about equality, and other duties and 
liberties inscribed in the central texts of a legal system.  But at a deeper 
level, the content of these rights will be shaped by a sense of what faculties 
and aspects of the legal person will have relevance for legal analysis.  
Indeed, as certain legal theorists have provocatively explored, the 
contemporary rule of law asserts and relies on a particular sense of the 
nature and psychology of the legal person, whose fundamental attributes 
both entitle her to legal rights and maker her a fit and appropriate subject 
for the exercise of legal power.13  It comes as little surprise that a liberal 
constitutional culture assumes a fundamentally liberal subject.   
With the contemporary confluence of constitutional and criminal 
law, an intriguing mirror has been held up to these features, turning the 
bases for the enjoyment of rights into the prerequisites for criminal 
responsibility.  As these two fields of law have fused, coherence is quite 
naturally sought in the image of the individual who is subject to state 
power, whether for the purposes of protecting her from that power or 
making her a proper subject of its coercive exercise.  The former becomes 
the basis for rights protection, the latter for criminal responsibility.  With 
the constitutionalization of criminal law, that which is valued in the 
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13 See, e.g., Ngaire Naffine, Law’s Meaning of Life: Philosophy, Religion, Darwin and the 




anthropology of the legal subject also becomes the foundation for the 
assignation of blame.   
 The priority given to the faculty of choice in Canadian rights 
analysis provides a sharp example of this instinct to coherence in the 
anthropology of the criminal/constitutional subject.  Some version of a 
focus on the exercise of will and the faculty of choice has influenced a 
range of constitutional rights and protections.  Choice has become central 
to the jurisprudence on equality – a particularly fertile soil in which to find 
claims about human nature – such that the presence or absence of choice 
is a key diagnostic for detecting discrimination.14  Freedom of religion is 
cast around the figure of the highly autonomous and free-choosing self, 
the guiding question being whether the individual retained a “meaningful 
choice” to practice his or her religion.15  Even rights associated with the 
criminal process, such as the right to silence and right to counsel, now turn 
on claims about individual choice.16  In each instance, the critique that has 
been levelled at the jurisprudence has been that this image of an 
autonomous, free-choosing agent is an impoverished one that ignores the 
influence of the social and the economic on the exercise of will.  
Meanwhile, choice has also been central to the constitutionalization 
of substantive criminal law in Canada.  The freely choosing agent is 
entitled to certain rights and protections, but is also one who can be 
blamed and punished.  In a mirror image of the rights jurisprudence, 
choice has become the lodestar for criminal liability, with the Supreme 
Court holding that punishment cannot take place absent “meaningful 
choice.”17  Resonant with the kinds of claims found in much equality 
jurisprudence, the Court holds that the failure to honor this principle 
offends the dignity of the human subject.18  The language of voluntariness 
has haemorrhaged throughout substantive criminal law, setting the 
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14 See Hester Lessard, ‘Charter Gridlock: Equality Formalism and Marriage 
Fundamentalism’, in Sheila McIntyre, Sandra Rodgers (eds.), Diminishing Returns: 
Inequality and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (2006), 291 ff; Diana 
Majury, 'Women are Themselves to Blame: Choice as a Justification for Unequal 
Treatment', in Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike, M. Kate Stephenson (eds.), Making 
Equlaity Rights Real: Securing Substantive Equality Under the Charter (2006), 209 ff.  
15 Benjamin L. Berger, ‘Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture’, (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall LJ 
277 ff.; Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567. 
16 See R. v. Spencer, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 500; R. v. Sinclair, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 3.  
17 R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 933. 




constitutional threshold for the law of actus reus and, as I will explore 
below, criminal defences. Yet as the understanding of the legal subject is 
mirrored in constitutional and criminal law, so too are the critiques.  The 
conceptions of choice that arise in the confluence of constitutional and 
substantive criminal law also turn out to be too bare and impoverished, ill-
fitted to taking meaningful account of the complex ways that choices are 
made real, are shaped by history, social and economic inequality, and 
mental health.   
 
3. The Rule of Proportionality 
 
The ascendancy of proportionality review as the defining 
characteristic of modern constitutionalism is well observed.19  Despite the 
variation in the historical traditions and legal cultures shaping 
constitutionalism in modern western democracies, there is striking 
convergence on the idea that constitutional judgment is ultimately an 
exercise in the refined and careful deployment of proportionality review.  
Some have described proportionality and balancing as the very task of the 
constitutional judge20 and even the “ultimate rule of law.”21  The rise of 
proportionality as the dominant logic of contemporary constitutionalism 
reflects a particular way of imagining the relationship of law to justice.  It 
is a way of conceiving of the constitutional order that is intimately linked 
to a claim about reason as the essence of the contemporary rule of law.22  
As Kahn puts it, “[p]roportionality is nothing more than the contemporary 
expression of reasonableness.”23 
As criminal law debates have shifted into a constitutional idiom, the 
grammar of proportionality has left a strong imprint on a substantial 
range of criminal law issues.  Indeed, this aspect of modern 
constitutionalism is well adapted to an encounter with criminal justice.  
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Mich L Rev 2677 ff; Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and 
Global Constitutionalism’, (2008) 47 Colum J Transnat’l L 72 ff; Benjamin L. Berger, 
‘The Abiding Presence of Conscience: Criminal Justice Against the Law and the Modern 
Constitutional Imagination’, (2011) 61 UTLJ 579 ff.  
20 Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (2006).  
21 David M. Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (2004).  
22 See Berger, (n. 19). 





The constitutional logic of proportionality appeals to something genetic in 
criminal law theory, the influential idea of proportionality as the 
philosophical lodestar for just punishment, a principle emblematically 
articulated by Cesare Beccaria in his volume On Crimes and 
Punishment.24  Furthermore, the principle of proportionality has long 
been central to the law of criminal defences, playing a particularly patent 
role in the law of self-defence, wherein the core criterion in justifying 
otherwise criminal violence is the measure of proportionality.  Indeed, one 
might be moved to say that the notion of proportionality as the governing 
ethic for legitimate violence has generalized to become the foundational 
constitutional ethic for all rights-affecting government activity.  Perhaps, 
then, the lines of influence should be reversed, with contemporary 
constitutional law having come around to the logic of criminal punishment.   
Whatever the best version of the history of the migration of legal 
ideas, proportionality analysis has found fertile soil in constitutional 
reflection on criminal law issues.  Again, the Canadian experience, in 
which the rule of proportionality is the heart of constitutional analysis and 
pervasive in the criminal law, is merely illustrative of broader trends.  
Given what I have discussed, perhaps the least surprising appearance of 
the rule of proportionality in the criminal law is in constitutional 
principles governing criminal punishment.  What was, in Beccaria’s hands, 
criminal justice theory, and later a banner under which criminal justice 
reformers marched, has now become a constitutional standard.  As I will 
discuss further below, the constitutional law governing cruel and unusual 
punishment has worked itself out using concepts of gross 
disproportionality.   
But the rule of proportionality has had an even more pervasive 
influence on substantive criminal law.  In a world in which limits on rights 
are assessed through an “all things considered” balancing of means and 
ends, the whole of the criminal law, with its intrinsic limitation of basic 
liberties, becomes subject to that logic.  And so as rights become the 
language in which the legitimacy of criminal law is questioned – be it in 
terms of constraints on expression, association, privacy, or just general 
claims to liberty – and courts become the forum in which reform is sought, 
the very question of the justified limits of substantive criminal law reduces 
to a question of constitutional proportionality.  In Canada, this 
overarching logic of constitutional analysis even touches upon mens rea 
requirements, with proportionality between the degree of moral fault and 
the gravity of the crime/seriousness of the penalty becoming a principle of 
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fundamental justice and the constitutional measuring stick for 
constitutionally acceptable levels of fault.  
 
4. Judgment, Discretion, and Mercy 
 
The commodious standard of proportionality seems to offer itself to 
all legal decisions.  This extension of the rule of proportionality is part of 
an aspiration to see all legal judgment, all justice, bound by a legal rule.  
This is a cherished hope in the project of modern constitutionalism.  It is 
one expression of the rule of law, the constitutional ambition to have a 
government of standards and law, not discretion and power.  The 
saturation of criminal law with concepts of proportionality is, thus, 
expressive of this larger pattern and set of constitutional hopes.  The 
criminal law is a text on which this ambition has been written.   
But the criminal law also challenges the adequacy of this powerful 
modern constitutional imagination.  It has persistently raised instances in 
which the circles of justice and law have not been coextensive, in which the 
tools of liberal legal rule have seemed inadequate to the task of doing 
justice in response to crime and victimization.  In these instances criminal 
law has reminded constitutional theory of the irrepressible role of 
discretion, of conscientious judgment, and of mercy in the constitutional 
order – that there remains passion and compassion in the fabric of 
constitutionalism.   
Such passion and feeling in claims of justice has nefarious 
expressions, of course.  The uses of and exceptions from ordinary criminal 
justice to respond to terror post 9/11 are one such instance.  The 
criminalization of migration around the world stands as another example25 
and, of course, the criminal law has been a tool for the expression of 
homophobia and racism.  Such cases have forced constitutional law to 
reckon with its capacity to respond to fear, ignorance, and the associated 
excesses of executive and legislative authority.26   
Yet the criminal justice system has also consistently reminded 
constitutional law of the unruly but ineradicable place of mercy and equity 
as a part of our constitutional lives.27  The criminal law, invested so 
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25 Juliet Stumpf, ‘The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power’, 
(2006) 56 Am U LR 367 ff.  
26 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Air Transport Security Case, 
BVerfG, 1 BvR 357/05 vom 15.2.2006, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 154). 




thoroughly as it is with human sorrow and tragedy, has insisted that 
judgment in a just constitutional order cannot be exhausted by tests (or, in 
Alexy’s hands, formulae) 28  of proportionality.  Judgment cannot be 
satisfied by reason alone, but will instead draw on faculties of compassion 
and mercy (in addition to fear and contempt).  And so, when Robert 
Latimer faced a jury of his peers, charged with the murder of his severely 
disabled and ill daughter who had only a life of pain ahead of her, that jury 
sought to ignore the law, calling for a parole ineligibility period of only 1 
year, when the law demanded 10.  Although the Supreme Court of Canada 
refused to give force to the jury’s recommendation, insisting on the 10-
year minimum, the case ignited debates about criminal and constitutional 
justice despite the law.29  As a conservative-populist crime agenda has 
taken hold in Canada and minimum sentences, along with other “tough on 
crime” policies, have proliferated, issues of constitutional exemptions, the 
need for discretion, and the virtue of a system with room for mercy have 
taken on renewed salience.  Equity and mercy have also continued to 
imprint on fundamental doctrines of criminal responsibility, often 
enlisting constitutional norms to find exceptions to traditional principles.  
Extraordinary cases, calling for compassion and concession to the harsh 
realities of human experience, have stretched and challenged the law of 
criminal defences, which has always been a repository for principles that 
acknowledge the affective realities that law’s reason must accommodate. 
All of this reflects yet another way in which fundamental issues of 
legal and political theory have worked themselves out at the confluence of 
criminal and constitutional law.  With devices like jury nullification, the 
extraordinary justice of pardons, the day-to-day exercises of discretion on 
which the system depends, and its endless supply of truly hard cases, the 
criminal law has played an important role in insisting on the place of 
discretion and mercy in our constitutional lives.  At the same time, 
constitutional law has offered itself as a modern language of principle in 
which judges can speak when justice must be done outside the received 
shape of criminal law. 
   
 
II. The Constitutionalization of Substantive Criminal Law 
 
 One theme of this chapter is the way in which the criminal law has 
been a stage for the dramatic display of key issues in contemporary 
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
28 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, transl. Julian Rivers (2002).  




constitutionalism. Those interested in understanding the core 
problematics of contemporary constitutionalism must have regard to the 
dynamics and dilemmas found in substantive criminal law.  The selection 
of themes canvassed in the first half of this chapter offer a starting point 
for further research into these deeper structural relationships between 
constitutional and criminal law.   
 Yet there is another dynamic involved in the confluence of these 
two areas of law, one that has arguably had more concrete and immediate 
effects.  The constitutionalization of criminal law has also meant the 
migration of traditional substantive criminal law debates into new 
constitutional registers.  What were once matters of substantive criminal 
law policy would now be debated as issues of fundamental freedoms, 
rights to equality and liberty, and the scope of permissible state 
interference in such rights and freedoms.  Constitutional law would give a 
doctrinal foothold for traditional philosophical debates in substantive 
criminal law, old saws and hobbyhorses of criminal law theory now taking 
on new juridical salience.   
In Canada, this translation of substantive criminal law into a 
constitutional idiom was accompanied by hopes for the advancement and 
liberalization of criminal law doctrine, as well as the insulation of issues of 
crime and punishment from populist expressions of politics.  Yet both 
ambitions have been unevenly realized, disappointing some and teaching 
all something about the limits of the transformative potential – and 
perhaps even certain dangers – of rights constitutionalism.  It would be 
wrong to conclude that, in the Canadian case at least, no progress was 
made with the application of constitutional concepts in the criminal law; 
certain constitutional protections have made criminal law more temperate 
and humane.  It would be very wrong, however, to be too sanguine about 
the achievements of constitutional criminal law: the experience has just as 
often been one of constitutional rights deflecting legal debate from 
aspirational principles to mere minimum standards.  Each of the following 
examples tells a part of this complex story of the constitutionalization of 
substantive criminal law, while also giving concrete expression to the 
broader themes discussed above.  
 
1. The Limits of the Criminal Law 
 
The issue of the substantive limits of criminal law has long been 




Devlin debate,30 this foundational policy issue within substantive criminal 
law has asked whether there are principled boundaries on the kinds of 
activity can be regulated by criminal law, and what kinds of social 
concerns are appropriate subjects for this most coercive form of state 
regulation.  Can the criminal law legitimately be used to pursue moral 
aims, encoding in the law the views and sentiments of the dominant 
community, as Devlin argued it could?  Or, as Hart argued, echoing Mill’s 
classic assertion of a “harm principle” limiting the permissible scope of 
legislation, must the criminal law be underwritten by some claim that it is 
preventing a more or less tangible harm to others?   
What was a matter of legal theory and criminal law policy has, with 
the constitutionalization of criminal law, become a question of legality.  In 
this, the reframing of this issue in the language of rights and its 
transformation into a justiciable issue serves as an interesting instance of 
the legalization of politics in liberal constitutional orders.  Comaroff and 
Comaroff argue that the contemporary appeal to legal instruments and 
procedures to address matters once remitted to democractic politics is a 
neoliberal response to the challenges of deep ethical difference.31  The 
apparent neutrality of legal language offers an appealing respite from the 
political, and the movement of morally charged policy debates about the 
uses of criminal law into the courtroom is an outstanding case in point.  
Constitutionalization has given the judiciary a new role in defining the 
substantive limits of criminal law and some of the most contentious moral 
and ethical issues in western democracies – abortion, hate speech, and the 
rights of sexual minorities, to name just a few – have thereby transferred 
from the domain of representative politics to the courts. 
Doctrinally, these issues appear in a variety of ways within different 
constitutional traditions.  In the United States a number of questions 
concerning the constitutional limits of criminal law have arisen through 
the protection of privacy in the substantive due process clause,32 with 
others taking the form of First Amendment protections on expression.33  
In other constitutional systems, similar issues have been framed 
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differently.34 Whatever the vernacular, the structure is the same: the threat 
of punishment makes criminal law a radical restraint on liberty and rights 
claims become the means of testing the boundaries of criminalization. 
Canada has produced a rich constitutional jurisprudence on the 
limits of criminal law, with cases touching on matters such as prostitution, 
polygamy, drug policy, assisted suicide, and hate speech.  I wish to focus 
on two themes or patterns that arise from this case law that will have 
resonance in other constitutional and criminal systems: the role played by 
the concept of “harm” and the salience and impact of equality norms.   
The pivotal role played by the concept of harm in the history of 
debates about the limits of criminal law has persisted with the 
constitutionalization of the issue.  The most direct appearance of the 
regulative idea of harm in the field of constitutional criminal law is the 
question of whether the harm principle is, itself, a constitutional principle 
limiting the scope of criminal legislation.  In Canada this issue arose in 
relation to drug policy with the R. v. Malmo-Levine case.35  The accused, 
charged with possession of a small amount of marijuana, argued that the 
prohibition on simple possession of the drug was unconstitutional because 
the conduct posed no risk of harm to others.  Malmo-Levine argued that 
Mill’s harm principle was, in the language of s. 7 of the Canadian Charter, 
a “principle of fundamental justice” such that any criminal legislation was 
unconstitutional if the criminalized conduct did not cause tangible harm to 
others.  Assisted by the trial judge’s findings of fact, which suggested that 
moderate use of marijuana did not cause serious harm to others, the case 
made its way to the Supreme Court of Canada.  The Court held that, 
though it might be good criminal law policy, the harm principle was not a 
principle of fundamental justice for the purposes of the Charter. 
Though it has been rejected as an independent constitutional limit 
on the criminal law, the harm principle nevertheless remains central to 
constitutional judgments about the boundaries of criminal legislation.  The 
centrality of proportionality to the analysis of rights claims gives harm 
pride of place in the justification of limits on fundamental freedoms.  
Given the cultural appeal and purchase of arguments about harm, laws 
that limit expressive freedoms (like hate-speech crimes or the 
criminalization of obscenity) or religious freedoms (like polygamy 
prohibitions) will frequently be justified by reference to the harms caused 
by the conduct in question.  In the means-ends rationality of modern 
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constitutionalism, judgments about harm will be central to defending the 
use of criminal law as well-tailored and proportionate (and, therefore, 
constitutionally acceptable) limits on liberty.  Of course, the normative 
dependence of these judgments – what counts as a harm and how 
seriously a given harm is treated – is another betrayal of the neutrality 
offered by the legalization of politics.36 
The other notable aspect of the constitutionalization of questions 
around the limits of criminal law is the opportunity that this has given for 
the increased influence of equality norms on the shape and functions of 
substantive criminal law.  As the substantive boundaries of criminal law 
becomes a constitutional matter, it comes into direct contact with equality 
norms that, although despairingly marginal in the historical development 
of criminal law, have such a central role in modern constitutional cultures.  
The imprint of constitutional equality norms on questions of the legitimate 
ambit of criminal legislation can be seen in a number of areas.  First, 
equality rights and commitments have inflected the debates about harm 
canvassed above.  Viewed through the lens of equality, certain harms come 
into focus that might not have been previously visible to the law, and other 
harms simply loom larger in the balancing used to justify limits on liberty.  
Thus, in cases that have challenged the constitutionality of criminal limits 
on obscenity, 37  the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized 
“communicative harms,” and in particular negative messaging about 
women apt to exacerbate gender subordination, as crucial to the 
justification for such crimes.  Similarly, a decision upholding the 
constitutionality of the crime of polygamy leaned heavily on the practice’s 
potentially harmful effects on women.38  Equality, arguably the basal norm 
of modern rights constitutionalism, conditions the analysis of harm. 
But equality rights and values have had an even more direct role in 
the setting substantive limits to criminal law.  Equality reasoning has 
increasingly served as the principal constitutional basis for the 
invalidation of certain crimes.  Though often framed in terms of privacy or 
autonomy rights, the decriminalization of abortion is irreducibly about 
gender equality and anti-subordination.39  Lawrence v. Texas,40 again cast 
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as a privacy case due to the particularities of the U.S. constitutional 
provisions, was the American instantiation of a set of constitutional 
victories for the equality of sexual minorities that has taken place through 
debates about the limits of criminal legislation.41  In Canada, challenges to 
the criminalization of prostitution have relied on the link between sexual 
violence and gender equality 42  and the principal rationale for the 
invalidation of the criminal bar on assisted suicide in Canada was the 
discriminatory effect that such a crime had on the severely disabled.43  
Thus, in a variety of ways, the transfer of philosophical debates about the 
limits of criminal law into a constitutional idiom has seen a greater role for 
equality in giving substantive shape to the criminal law.   
 
2. The Constitutionalization of Fault 
 
The greatest potential for the impact of constitutional principles on 
the structure and operation of substantive criminal law lies in their 
application to the law of mens rea.  Principles of mental fault encode basic 
positions about fairness and fundamental justice in the attribution of 
blame, and have something to say about every matter brought to the 
criminal law.  In this respect, this aspect of substantive criminal law seems 
uniquely well fitted to interact with constitutional norms and principles, 
setting limits on criminal law in a far more quotidian way than is found in 
time-to-time constitutional challenges to various offences.   
And, indeed, this was the area of criminal law doctrine that 
attracted the most excited hopes and ambitions in Canada with the 
introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. To that point there 
had been a slow common law evolution regarding principles of criminal 
fault.  Faced with a Criminal Code that was rarely explicit about mens rea 
requirements, judges had articulated interpretive principles regarding 
fault and had established common law presumptions.  But in a context of 
true parliamentary sovereignty in matters of criminal justice, these 
remained just principles and presumptions.  Would constituitonalization 
transform interpretive principles into constitutional imperatives, offering 
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greater protection for the fair treatment of the accused – and restraint in 
the use of the penal law as a tool of governance – than was previously 
possible?  The Canadian story provides an evocative point for reflection on 
– and perhaps some lessons about – the nature of the constitutionalization 
of fault.44   
This story began dramatically with the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
decision in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act.45  Over the course of the 20th 
century, with the rise of the regulatory state, the law of mens rea as it 
governed public welfare offences had undergone substantial change.  
Although there had been a traditional presumption that mens rea was 
required for true crimes, the long-standing position was that absolute 
liability – the absence of any fault requirement – would be acceptable for 
public welfare or “regulatory” offences.46  By the late 1970s, however, the 
courts had become dissatisfied with imposing liability for offences – even 
regulatory offences – without any fault requirement whatsoever.  In R. v. 
Sault Ste Marie,47 the Supreme Court of Canada created a “halfway house” 
between the fault presumptions for true crime and a complete absence of a 
mens rea requirement.  The Court articulated a common law presumption 
for strict liability in regulatory or public welfare offences.  That is, unless 
the statutory language prohibited such an interpretation, the Courts would 
presume that an accused could not be convicted of a regulatory offence if 
he could show that he had exercised due diligence.  In effect, carelessness 
was the new common law standard for fault in regulatory offences.  BC 
Motor Vehicles, decided in 1985, was such a significant case because, as 
the Supreme Court’s first foray into the interaction of constitutional law, it 
held that this presumption would now be a constitutional requirement.  
Aided by some inventive work in the interpretation of s. 7 of the Charter, 
the Court held that the principles of fundamental justice meant that “a law 
that has the potential to convict a person who had not really done anything 
wrong”48 – viz, absolutely liability – was unconstitutional if punishment 
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could result in the deprivation of liberty.  This decision had two important 
effects.  First, an important constitutional minimum was thereby set in 
Canadian criminal law: one could not combine imprisonment with 
absolute liability.  Secondly, and of more general interest, the case 
reflected one possible mode of interaction between constitutional 
principles and the criminal law: the constitutional entrenchment of 
common law notions of fairness.   
Canada had also been working out a great divide that mirrored a 
central theme in criminal law theory, the contest between subjective and 
objective theories of fault.  While certain scholars of criminal law 
advocated for the greater use – or at least acceptability – of objective 
forms of fault,49 the trend in Canadian common law had been towards 
subjectivity in criminal fault.  By 1978, the Court had held that, absent 
language to the contrary, the strong presumption would be that any true 
crime, as distinct from regulatory offences, would require subjective mens 
rea.  Would this presumption also be constitutionalized?  The answer was 
interestingly ambivalent.  On the one hand, the Supreme Court took the 
important step of invalidating Canada’s constructive murder provisions on 
the grounds that such a serious crime – what the Court labeled a “stigma 
offence” – demanded full subjective mens rea. 50   The fact that the 
constructive murder provision allowed for conviction without subjective 
foresight of death made it constitutionally infirm.  The conceptual basis 
upon which the Court made this decision is also notable – it employed a 
proportionality principle.  The Court reasoned that the principles of 
fundamental justice required proportionality between the moral 
blameworthiness of the offender and the stigma and penalty associated 
with the crime.  In the case of murder, this proportionality principle 
mandated subjective foresight of death.   
Yet on the other hand, the Court swiftly contained the reach of this 
demand for subjective mens rea when met with the many forms of 
objective fault found in the criminal law, including reasonable foresight 
requirements, requirements for reasonable steps, and reasonable person 
standards.  Only a very few offences would be labeled “stigma offences” 
and for the rest – the vast preponderance of true crimes (including 
manslaughter51) – objective mens rea would suffice.  Proportionality 
between moral blame and stigma/penalty would also mean that a 
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minimum degree of carelessness would be required for true crimes,52 but 
the principle had no real purchase in the meaty middle that, in fact, 
represented most crimes.   
In effect, through constitutional analysis, the Court gave its blessing 
to a large margin of policy discretion for Parliament in the arena of 
criminal fault.  When combined with a very low standard for causation, 
which has also received constitutional approval, the result is a substantive 
criminal law that casts the net of liability very broadly, indeed.53  As Kent 
Roach had noted, a gap has opened up between the wisdom reflected in 
the common law of fault and the governing constitutional principles.54  
Crucially, in constitutional matters, such a gap is really a warrant, 
comforting a legislature that the only standard with which it need concern 
itself is the bare constitutional threshold.  With this, we see another form 
of the interaction between constitutional principles and substantive 
criminal law: the translation of aspirational standards into mere 
minimums, with the consequent shift of attention from what is wise to 
what is permitted. 
This unfolding also troubles the conceit that constitutionalism will 
naturally insulate criminal law from the populism and politics that so 
often sets upon the topic.  No area of substantive law has a greater 
potential impact on the day-to-day efficacy of a crime control agenda than 
does the law of fault.  Yet in Canada, despite the setting of important 
constitutional thresholds at the very high and very low end of the ladder of 
crime, the law of mens rea has been largely undisturbed by constitutional 
analysis.  In this respect, constitutional law has served, rather than 
resisted, the radical expansion of crime control agendas.  From time to 
time a crime is challenged as unconstitutional, and the result is both 
interesting and important.  As we will see in the next section, 
constitutional law has had things of philosophical and even media interest 
to say about the (often extraordinary) law of criminal defences.  But the 
story of the constitutionalization of fault in Canada is a reminder of the 
relative marginality of these intriguing cases from the everyday realities of 
governance through criminal law.   
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3. Constitutional Principles and Criminal Defences 
 
One can find an elaborate picture of the social and internal lives of 
individuals in the law of criminal defences.  Criminal defences stake out 
perspectives on how emotion works on individual will, as evident in 
defences like provocation.55  The law of necessity and duress trade on 
assumptions about the limits of human endurance and fortitude.  Defences 
depend on conceptions of the sources and nature of vulnerability, both 
mental and physical.  This area of law not only makes descriptive claims 
about these many aspects of human experience, it judges their significance 
to personal responsibility and, in so doing, shapes attitudes about 
appropriate responses to the extremities of life.  Criminal defences thus 
say a great deal about judgment, mercy, and exceptions in the legal order, 
lending this area to constitutional reflection. 
Constitutional principles have appeared in the law of criminal 
defences in a couple of distinctive ways.  On the one hand, constitutional 
principles have been generated inductively from the structure of classic 
criminal law doctrine, resulting in guiding standards against which to 
evaluate criminal defences.  On the other, a “soft” form of constitutional 
rule has seen the tacit norms of the constitutional order – what the 
Supreme Court of Canada has called “Charter values” – used to direct the 
development of the common law of criminal defences.  Both of these 
influences of constitutional principles have transformed aspects of the 
criminal justice system, largely in the direction of greater compassion, 
making the criminal law more sensitive and responsive to a broader range 
of human experiences.  Yet the abiding gaps in criminal defences, those 
areas of suffering and marginalization compounded rather than alleviated 
by the criminal law and about which constitutional law seems to have little 
to say, gesture to the structural limits of constitutional justice. 
The organizing constitutional idea in the law of criminal defences in 
Canada has become the concept of “moral involuntariness.”  Originally 
introduced in a celebrated necessity case,56 the phrase lay largely dormant 
in the criminal law until 2001 and the case of R. v. Ruzic.57  Ruzic was the 
crescendo in a long development in the interpretation of the defence of 
duress in Canada, which had both a broad common law test and a 
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significantly narrowed statutory expression.  Prior to the Charter, the 
Court was limited to interpretive techniques in softening the harshness of 
these statutory restrictions.  Ruzic provided the opportunity for a 
constitutional coup de grace, in the full resonances of that phrase.  The 
accused, living in Serbia, had been threatened with harm to herself and 
her mother if she refused to smuggle drugs into Canada.  She was 
apprehended on arrival in Canada, charged with importing narcotics, and 
pled duress.  The Criminal Code required that the threat that impelled the 
accused to commit the crime be imminent and that the threatenor be 
present when the crime was committed.  Ruzic could not fit herself within 
these requirements, yet the facts of the case cried out for relief.   
The Supreme Court of Canada held that these requirements were 
unconstitutional because the statute allowed for the conviction of the 
“morally involuntary.”  The Court generated this novel “principle of 
fundamental justice” by canvassing the internal structure and assumptions 
of the criminal law itself.  Crucially, the Court reasoned from the 
requirement for physical voluntariness noting that it reflected the 
informing principle that a person should only be punished for genuine 
expressions of their will. Indeed, the concept of “involuntariness” had 
already spread throughout the law of criminal defences, serving also as the 
basis for the defences of extreme intoxication58 and automatism.59  The 
Court held that the ubiquity of this principle reflected the criminal law’s 
concern for the autonomy of the human subject and its implicit 
commitment to respond to the individual’s capacity for meaningful choice.  
Translated into constitutional terms, the principle of moral 
involuntariness would mean that any law that would permit the conviction 
and punishment of the morally involuntary would be unconstitutional.  
With this, the Court articulated a new meta-standard for the constitutional 
scrutiny of criminal defences and arguably installed the concept as the 
touchstone for criminal blame.  This new principle clearly bears the 
imprint of criminal law doctrine, inductively created as it was from other 
principles of criminal responsibility.  Yet most interesting for present 
purposes is that, whether intended or not, this new principle brings 
criminal law into harmony with an important theme in liberal 
constitutionalism, discussed earlier: the analytic priority of “choice”.  The 
creation of this moral involuntariness standard in criminal law thus 
reflects an inclination for coherence between criminal and constitutional 
logics.   
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Yet some of the most profound impacts of constitutional law in the 
realm of criminal defences have come through more subtle means.  One 
important such influence has been the increased salience and force of 
equality norms – and, in particular, principles of gender equality – in the 
development of the common law governing criminal defences.  The most 
celebrated example in Canada involved the reinterpretation of the law of 
self-defence to respond to the realities of spousal violence.  The case was R. 
v. Lavallée 60  and although Justice Bertha Wilson nowhere explicitly 
applied the equality protections of the Charter, the dominant note in the 
decision is the need to ensure that women receive the equal benefit and 
protection of the criminal law.  Permitting the introduction of evidence of 
“battered spouse syndrome” and ridding the interpretation of self-defence 
of any strict demand for imminence of apprehended harm, the heart of 
Justice Wilson’s decision was the demand that the ubiquitous concept of 
the “reasonable person,” upon which so much criminal law depends, must 
be sufficiently large to take account of the lived realities of battered women.  
A similar imprint of constitutional norms of equality on the common law 
construction of reasonableness can be found in the case of the 
internationally beleaguered defence of provocation.  In Canada, the 
Supreme Court has held that so long as the defence continues to exist, the 
ordinary person – central to the defence – should not be informed by 
beliefs that are inconsistent with “contemporary norms of behaviour, 
including fundamental values such as the commitment to equality 
provided for in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.”61  Hence, 
it would be improper to ascribe homophobic or gender unequal beliefs to 
the reasonable person when evaluating the defence of provocation.   
The substantive law of criminal defences has thus offered occasion 
for the expression of commitment to constitutional principles while being 
the site for significant advances and innovations in the doctrine.  Indeed, I 
have left untouched one of the most dramatic transformations of 
substantive Canadian criminal law in view of constitutional principles: the 
invalidation of Parliament’s scheme for addressing the defence of insanity 
on the grounds that operation of the scheme was fundamentally unfair to 
mentally disordered accused and treated them on the basis of stereotypical 
views of dangerousness and mental illness. 62   The new scheme that 
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resulted modernized the law of mental disorder in Canada.63  Yet, as much 
as it shows the progressive potential of constitutional principles at play in 
the law of criminal defences, the example of mental disorder also issues a 
important reminder about the capacity of criminal law to occlude some 
forms of injustice while addressing others.  The narrowness of the legal 
definition of mental disorder means that, however constitutionally 
enlightened the legal procedures, a substantial criminalization of the 
mentally ill continues to take place.64  Self-congratulation is precluded by 
the reality that the vicious results of gendered violence have already been 
suffered by the time modernized iterations of self-defence and provocation 
are applied in the courts.  And poverty continues to be the chief ingredient 
in crime and punishment alike.  On these points, constitutional principles 
have had precious little to offer.   
 
4. Constitutional Standards for Punishment 
 
Punishment is one of the most rawly exposed exercises of state 
sovereignty that remains in contemporary legal systems.  In this, a great 
constitutional theme is worked out through the daily business of 
sentencing courts.  That the law of sentencing and punishment has been 
comparatively undisturbed by overt constitutional analysis belies the 
intrinsically constitutional aspect of this dimension of criminal law. But in 
addition to its essential expression of the sovereignty that underwrites the 
criminal law, this area has also been a site at which the prevailing 
constitutional logic of proportionality has marked its insistent advance.65  
These are odd bedfellows: the antique drama of sovereignty and the 
modern juridical science of proportionality.  Perhaps this is the reason that 
the area has thus far proven so resistant to robust constitutionalization, 
the exposed reality of sovereign force being ultimately indigestible by 
liberal constitutional thought.   
There are really two questions that arise when one considers the 
relevance of constitutional law to the practices of criminal punishment: 
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namely, the constitutional principles governing the forms of punishment, 
and those that structure and constrain the manner of sentencing.   
With respect to the former, the crucial issue across criminal justice 
systems has been the constitutionality of capital punishment.  In Canada, 
constitutional debates on this issue have drawn out the themes of 
sovereignty and proportionality in unique ways.  Given that capital 
punishment is not available in Canada, constitutional reflection on the 
death penalty has arisen in the context of extradition to face the death 
penalty in another jurisdiction, a framing of the matter that brings the 
sovereign dimension of criminal punishment into high relief.  Moreover, 
courts have interpreted the governing constitutional standard shared by a 
number of constitutional systems – a prohibition on cruel and unusual 
treatment or punishment – as amounting to a question of whether the 
impugned sentence is grossly disproportionate, such that it would “outrage 
standards of decency.”66  Armed with that standard, in 1991 the Supreme 
Court initially found that extradition to face the death penalty did not 
offend the constitution,67 but reversed course just 10 years later.  In 2001, 
in view of the principles of Canadian criminal justice, the convergence of 
international consensus, and the domestic and international experience of 
wrongful convictions, the Court held that it was unconstitutional to 
extradite without assurances that the death penalty would not be sought.68  
The decision effectively rendered the death penalty unconstitutional.  
Short of the extreme mark of capital punishment, however, 
constitutional law has thus far had little to say about the forms and real 
experiences of criminal punishment.  Imprisonment is marked by violence, 
degradation, and needless fatalities. Prison conditions are often 
determined by low-level discretionary decisions that are insusceptible to 
meaningful review. Perhaps state acquiescence to foreseeable suffering 
will emerge as a constitutionally sufficient wrong; until then, the focus on 
formal state action in matters of criminal punishment have left 
constitutional law remarkably (perhaps blissfully) naïve to and 
disconnected from the realities of punishment. 
When it comes to the methods of sentencing, rather than the forms 
of punishment, the challenge has come from mandatory minimum 
sentences and other forms of structured sentencing. Minimum sentences 
make immodest legal claims.  They purport to define the threshold of just 
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and appropriate punishment for each and every circumstance; they deny 
the possibility of the exceptional case.  In so doing, they preclude the 
exercise of discretion and mercy, while frustrating the governing 
sentencing principle of proportionality.   
Exceptional cases invariably arise in the criminal law, a truth to 
which the case law attests and that the law of affirmative defences in part 
acknowledges.  The constitutional question is what to do about the 
injustices that are, thus, the inevitable spinoff of minimum sentences.  
This question has become particularly pressing in Canada where the 
current government favours the proliferation of minimum sentences as a 
means of advancing a “tough on crime” agenda.  Although Canadian courts 
experimented with using constitutional law as a kind of safety valve, 
offering relief in the extraordinary case,69 the ultimate position has been to 
reassert the primacy of the principle of proportionality, invalidating in its 
entirety any minimum sentence that runs afoul of the “gross 
disproportionality” standard on the facts of a given case, or even a 
reasonable hypothetical.70  Of course, a great deal of unfairness can take 
place short of gross disproportionality.  The “merely excessive” sentence is 
nevertheless an instance of the unnecessary state infliction of pain on the 
individual.  And with this, the problem of mandatory minimum sentences 
in the field of sentencing law teases out a theme of crucial constitutional 
significance: that discretion and mercy seem to be ineradicable 
components of a fundamentally just criminal law. 
 
III. Conclusion: The Constitutional Lessons of Criminal Law 
 
 This chapter has pointed to the many ways in which criminal law 
has assumed a central position in the expression of constitutional 
principles and themes, and in which criminal law has been transformed by 
– or has remained stable in spite of – the influence of contemporary 
constitutionalism.  Yet criminal law remains something of an 
embarrassing underbelly of the legal system, to be grudgingly 
acknowledged by constitutional theory, avoided if possible.  Theories are 
spun with little sustained regard to the organizing principles and 
problematics in this crucible of constitutional justice.  Even the philosophy 
of criminal law – concerned though it is with issues of blame, 
responsibility, and punishment – is too often a swing from one treetop to 
another, with little attention to the roots of criminal law, which are found 
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in the lived and messy realities of suffering, victimization, and punishment.  
And so despite the rich interactions between criminal and constitutional 
law that this chapter has canvassed, despite the claims made for the 
centrality of criminal law to constitutional reflection, perhaps we are not 
as far from Milsom’s view of the criminal law’s place in the system of 
justice as we ought to be.   
 It is the unseemly, exceptional, and legally unruly nature of 
criminal justice that should, in fact, attract our constitutional regard, just 
as it should have drawn Milsom’s interest.  Refocused attention on the 
constitutional dimensions of criminal law will enrich the study of both.  As 
I have argued, criminal law is, in fact, a microcosm for the constitutional, a 
distilled expression of the concerns at the heart of constitutional reflection.  
Reginald Allen offered a compendious statement of the themes of this 
chapter when he described the constitutional aspect of criminal law thusly: 
“It is in the criminal process that the law and government most narrowly 
touch, beneficently and also dangerously, the lives of the governed.  And it 
is here that instinct and passion beat hardest on rationality and 
restraint.”71  Criminal law is among the first arenas in which we see deeper 
constitutional commitments; it also reveals and tests the limits of the 
social justice that these commitments imagine.  The poverty, illness, and 
social dislocation that continue to drive the criminal law point to the 
economic and social structures that are left largely undisturbed by 
constitutional law.  The force of state power, the salience of sovereignty, 
and the need for conscience all so evident in the criminal law are a forceful 
reminder of the abiding role of less rational forms of the political in our 
constitutional lives.   
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71 Reginald Allen, ‘The Trial of Socrates: A Study in the Morality of the Criminal Process’, 
in Martin L. Friedland (ed.), Courts and Trials: A Multidisciplinary Approach (1975), 4 ff. 
